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KEEPING THE GOVERNMENT‘S RELIGION PURE: 
PLEASANT GROVE CITY V. SUMMUM 
Christopher C. Lund 
In January, the Supreme Court decided Pleasant Grove City v. Sum-
mum.1  Summum, a religious organization, sought the right to put up a per-
manent monument of its Seven Aphorisms—its version of the Ten 
Commandments—in a local city park.  At the time, the park had about fif-
teen other monuments, including a traditional Ten Commandments display.  
But this was a Free Speech case, not an Establishment Clause case.  The 
plaintiffs were not trying to use the First Amendment to have the existing 
Ten Commandments display removed; they were instead trying to use the 
First Amendment to force the city into displaying their monument as well. 
Most people expected the plaintiffs to lose.  And they did, clearly and 
unanimously.  I publicly predicted that Summum would lose on the day the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari,2 and suggested that it might be unanim-
ous a few hours after oral argument.3  But I do not claim any special powers 
of foresight.  My point is actually the opposite—anyone with experience in 
this area could recognize that the plaintiffs faced an uphill climb.  They 
were asking for a sweeping change in the law, and it was no surprise that 
they did not get it. 
This Essay explains the decision in Summum, giving special focus to 
the religious dimensions of the case.  Summum, again, was decided on Free 
Speech grounds.  It was not an Establishment Clause case.  But it neverthe-
less reveals much about the course that the Supreme Court is now charting 
with the Establishment Clause. 
I. THE BACKGROUND OF SUMMUM 
The facts in Summum were straightforward.  Pioneer Park is a small 
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The park had about fifteen permanent objects, one of which was a Ten 
Commandments display that had been donated to the City by the Fraternal 
Order of Eagles and erected in 1971.4  In 2003, and again in 2005, Sum-
mum sought and was denied permission to put up its own display—a dis-
play commemorating its Seven Aphorisms, which Summum believes are 
essentially the real Ten Commandments brought down by Moses from Si-
nai.5 
Summum‘s legal claim was similarly straightforward.  The Free 
Speech Clause prohibits government from discriminating among private 
speakers based on the content or viewpoint of their speech.6  Summum 
therefore argued that Pleasant Grove could not allow the Fraternal Order of 
Eagles to display their Ten Commandments in Pioneer Park without simul-
taneously allowing Summum to display its Seven Aphorisms.  But the City 
had a ready response to this argument.  Although government may not dis-
criminate among private speakers on the basis of their speech, altogether 
separate rules govern speech that comes from the government itself.  When 
the government itself speaks, it can generally choose to say what it likes.  
The usual prohibitions on content and viewpoint discrimination do not ap-
ply.7  And this holds true even when the government uses private parties to 
convey its message.8 
Thus, it was this disagreement over the identity of the speaker that was 
at the heart of the case.  If the existing Ten Commandments display were 
considered the Eagles‘ speech, Summum would win; if the display were 
considered the City‘s speech, Summum would lose.   
II. THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
Distinguishing between private and government speech is famously 
difficult, but at the extremes the difference is clear.  Think of Summum in 
terms of some raw numbers.  If Pleasant Grove City had been offered 100 
diverse, permanent displays for Pioneer Park and accepted 99 of them, the 
park would seem like a public forum for private speech.  The presence of so 
many monuments—and the City‘s manifested lack of concern over their 
contents—would cut against the claim that the government was somehow 
speaking through its selection of monuments.  To use the Court‘s terminol-
ogy, the City‘s action would be construed as an attempt to ―facilitate private 





  See Joint Appendix at 98–102, Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125 (No. 07-665), 2008 WL 2415597. 
5
  Id. at 57–64. 
6
  See, e.g., Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (link). 
7
  See Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect Storm, 96 GEO. L.J. 
1, 30 (2007) (―Government speech essentially operates as an ‗exception‘ to the First Amendment.‖) 
(link).  
8
  See Johanns v. Livestock Mktg. Ass‘n, 544 U.S. 550 (2005) (link); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 
(1991) (link). 
9
  Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 542 (2001) (link). 
104:46  (2009) Keeping the Government’s Religion Pure 
http://www.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2009/28/ 48 
In such a circumstance, Summum would be constitutionally entitled to put 
up its monument. 
Similarly, if Pleasant Grove City had been offered 100 permanent dis-
plays and accepted only 1 of them, then that would suggest a finding of go-
vernmental—rather than private—speech.  The City‘s exclusion of other 
messages would send a clear signal that it meant to adopt the display as its 
own.  It would be clear that the City was trying to ―speak or subsidize 
transmittal of a message it favors,‖ rather than trying to ―encourage a diver-
sity of views from private speakers.‖10  In that circumstance, Summum‘s 
claim would clearly fail. 
Summum involved a situation that fell somewhere between these two 
hypothetical extremes.  The strongest fact in Summum‘s favor was that its 
display was apparently the only display ever to be excluded from Pioneer 
Park.11  That was a bad fact for the City.  It suggested discrimination, of 
course, but it did not really get at the key issue—which was whether the 
government was being discriminating in its own speech (which would be 
fine) or whether the government was being discriminating in its preference 
of other peoples‘ speech (which would be unconstitutional).   
More constitutionally pertinent was the fact that few monuments were 
ever accepted by the park.  In the sixty years preceding Summum‘s request 
to display its Seven Aphorisms, the City only accepted about six monu-
ments from outside groups.  That was, on average, about one monument 
approved every decade.12  And a decision to approve one additional monu-
ment each decade simply does not seem like a decision to create a public fo-
rum for private speech—rather, it seems like Pleasant Grove is selecting 
individual monuments in which it sees particular merit or importance.  That 
is why the Court in Summum could so quickly conclude that permanent 
monuments in a city park are usually governmental speech.13  In a way, the 
Court was just concluding as a matter of law what everyone knows as a 
matter of common sense: that a local government that approves the display 
of a few objects in a public park does not mean that it intends to open up the 
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A bit more should be said about the details of Summum‘s argument.  
Again, Summum claimed that the Ten Commandments display was really 
the Eagles‘ speech, not the City‘s.  As explained above, that argument was 
hard to square with the number of objects in the park.  It was also hard to 
square with certain facts about the Ten Commandments display itself.  The 
display was donated to the City in 1971.  And for the subsequent thirty-
eight years, the City owned it, controlled it, and kept it in a park also exclu-
sively owned by the City.  To be sure, the Eagles periodically resurfaced—
they, for example, apparently cleaned the display a few years before the lit-
igation.15  But, by and large, the Eagles had been out of the picture.  And 
that too strongly cut against a finding that, almost forty years later, the mo-
nument was still their speech.  Summum tried to counter this point by ar-
guing that it could not be the government‘s speech until the City adopted it 
by some sort of official action.16  But this claim fell flat.  Justice Souter 
suggested that such a requirement would be ―a silly exercise in formality.‖17  
And he was right—it would have been trivially easy for Pleasant Grove to 
formally adopt the Ten Commandments display, thereby mooting Sum-
mum‘s case.  Such an adoption, of course, would have added some fuel to a 
potential Establishment Clause challenge, which presumably was part of the 
reason why Summum was advocating for it in the first place.18  Yet the dee-
per problem with Summum‘s argument was that there was no obvious rea-
son (and nothing in the Court‘s precedents) suggesting that the government 
had to officially adopt a message before it became government speech.  As 
Justice Scalia harshly put it to Summum‘s counsel, ―it may be a very nice 
world [you are imagining,] but it happens not to be the world under which 
our Constitution has subjected this country.‖19 
III. SUMMUM AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
I now turn to the religious dimensions of this case.  The religious as-
pects of Summum all lie below the surface.  Forms of the word ―religion‖ 
appear only five times in the majority opinion—twice to describe Summum 
as a religious organization, twice in referring to John Lennon‘s musical lyr-
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tually looming in the background were certain questions.  What about the 
Establishment Clause?  Does the existing Ten Commandments display in 
the park violate it?  And why did the plaintiffs push this somewhat implaus-
ible Free Speech Clause claim instead of a more conventional Establish-
ment Clause claim? 
History plays an important role in the explanation.  In 2005, the Su-
preme Court considered together two cases, each involving an Establish-
ment Clause challenge to a Ten Commandments display.21  The Court split 
on both cases.  One display was upheld, and one display was struck down.  
Four justices would have struck both down;22 four justices would have 
upheld both.23  The necessary fifth vote in both cases was Justice Breyer‘s.  
And Breyer voted to strike down the display in McCreary County, but to 
uphold the one in Van Orden.  All the other Justices recognized the Ten 
Commandments as religious in nature, even as they differed on the question 
of the monuments‘ constitutionality.  But Justice Breyer explained his vote 
in Van Orden by claiming that the display in that case was properly con-
ceived of as not religious—or, at least, that in context the display was more 
secular than religious.24 
Filing their complaint after Van Orden and McCreary County, the 
plaintiffs in Summum chose not to bring an Establishment Clause claim.25  
In some sense, they did not need to—at the time, there was actually another 
lawsuit, Society of Separationists v. Pleasant Grove City, that challenged 
Pioneer Park‘s Ten Commandments display on Establishment Clause 
grounds.26  But the plaintiffs in Society of Separationists eventually decided 
to voluntarily dismiss their suit, apparently believing it was doomed under 
Van Orden and McCreary County.27 
This is the backdrop to Summum: Summum is litigated under the as-
sumption that the Ten Commandments display in Pleasant Grove is secular 
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he only in part.28  So let us suspend this assumption.  If we consider the Ten 
Commandments display and the proposed Seven Aphorisms display as reli-
gious monuments and as religious statements—which they surely are, at 
least to some extent—then what does Summum mean for religious liberty?  
It is to that topic that I now turn. 
A. The Religious Implications of Summum 
In Van Orden and McCreary County, the Court was presented with the 
issue of whether government could endorse the Ten Commandments.  But 
left hanging in the air was a question: endorse them over what?  In Van Or-
den and McCreary County, that question was always tacit, always comfort-
ably hidden from view.  In Summum, it becomes explicit.  Endorsing the 
Ten Commandments means rejecting alternative versions of those Com-
mandments.  Pleasant Grove puts up the Ten Commandments and rejects 
Summum‘s Seven Aphorisms so as to send the message that the Ten Com-
mandments are true or important to the community, but the Seven Aphor-
isms are not.  And the obvious and inevitable message of exclusion sent to 
Summum is of no constitutional consequence.  Notable here, perhaps, was 
the Solicitor General‘s brief in support of the City.  It compared the City‘s 
display of the Ten Commandments to a memorial commemorating the Sep-
tember 11th attacks, while comparing Summum‘s proposed display to a 
memorial commemorating the al-Qaeda terrorists that carried them out.  
The implication, of course, was that Summum‘s message could properly be 
treated like al-Qaeda‘s: as false, dangerous, and un-American.29 
Summum also teaches an important lesson about the relationship be-
tween exclusion and endorsements.  Courts and commentators sometimes 
overlook how governmental endorsements of religion concomitantly in-
volve rejections of nonconforming religions.  Professor Noah Feldman, in a 
recent and influential book, argued that courts should abstain from striking 
down governmental religious speech in part because ―[t]alk can always be 
reinterpreted and more talk can always be added, so religious speech and 
symbols need not exclude.‖30  But this maybe misses the crucial point—
which is that government usually does not want to add more talk.  Summum 
is itself the proof of that.  Pleasant Grove did not want to allow Summum‘s 
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playing the Ten Commandments in the first place.  And this leads to anoth-
er point.  We sometimes speak of religious endorsements as causing 
sion—as if, in an ideal world, we might conceivably separate the en-
endorsement from the exclusion.  But this misunderstands something 
portant.  Exclusion and endorsement cannot be separated; they are flipsides 
of precisely the same coin.  For it is only by excluding other messages that 
government can create religious endorsements.  After all, to endorse every 
message is really to endorse no message at all.  Thus, in this sense, the gov-
ernment speech doctrine applied in Summum is actually a prerequisite to the 
government‘s very ability to endorse religion—the government needs the 
power to exclude contrary messages simply in order to create a religious 
endorsement at all.  Summum is therefore inescapably right and follows as a 
necessary corollary of Van Ordenif the government is going to have a re-
ligion, it must be able to keep that religion pure. 
There is another oddity to Summum, another oddity of applying the 
government speech doctrine to issues of religious speech.  The justification 
behind the government speech doctrine has always been in the idea of dem-
ocratic accountability.  If you do not like what the government says about 
abortion or inflation or beef,31 you have a remedy.  You can vote the rele-
vant government officials out of office and replace them with people who 
will voice your views instead.  As the Supreme Court put it in Summum, ―a 
government entity is ultimately ‗accountable to the electorate and the politi-
cal process for its advocacy,‘‖ and so, ―‗[i]f the citizenry objects, newly 
elected officials later could espouse some different or contrary position.‘‖32  
These lines from Summum are pulled from other cases, and they make 
little sense here in the context of religious speech.  Telling Summum that its 
―remedy‖ lies in winning elections is absurd; it returns Summum, a minis-
cule and marginalized religious minority, to seek redress of religious dis-
crimination in the very same political process that treated it unequally in the 
first place.  And it is deeply inconsistent with the Court‘s usual statements 
about religious liberty—it turns on its head the Court‘s famous and 
longstanding maxim that matters of religion ―may not be submitted to vote; 
they depend on the outcome of no elections.‖33  Moreover, no matter how 
many elections Summum wins, it will never be able to replace the existing 
Ten Commandments display with a display of its Seven Aphorisms.  For 
the Establishment Clause would clearly forbid that as an overly denomina-
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I now turn to two areas of Religion Clause litigation where Summum 
may be relevant in upcoming years.  The first is equal access cases, and the 
second is government endorsement cases.  In neither area will Summum rad-
ically change the law—indeed, in both areas Summum likely reinforces the 
conclusions that courts are already reaching.  Yet, as Summum casts some 
new light on these old issues, it is still well worth exploring. 
B. Going Forward: Summum and the Equal Access Cases 
A fascinating aspect of Summum is how it crosses up the usual party 
lines.  The plaintiffs in Summum attacked the City‘s display of the Ten 
Commandments.  So, going into the case, one would have expected the tra-
ditional left to support Summum‘s claim and the traditional right to oppose 
it.35  The reality was more complex.  For example, the Rutherford Institute, 
a conservative public interest organization, filed on Summum‘s behalf,36 
and many groups on the traditional left (for example, Americans United for 
Separation of Church and State, the Baptist Joint Committee, the Council 
for Secular Humanism) filed briefs ―in support of neither party.‖37  Some 
sort of explanation therefore seems appropriate. 
And the explanation is this.  For years, conservative groups have ar-
gued that it is unconstitutional to exclude religious voices from the public 
square.  A long line of cases now establishes that religious speakers are 
constitutionally entitled to equal access to government property for speech-
related purposes.38  One can see then why conservative public interest 
groups had some natural sympathy toward Summum‘s claim; after all, 
Summum too was seeking equal access to government property for reli-
gious speech.  And, of course, Summum created similar difficulties for 
groups on the political left.  While liberal groups supported Summum‘s at-
tack on this particular Ten Commandments display, they also recognized 
that Summum‘s legal theory (if adopted by the Court) could potentially un-
dermine the legal basis for their traditional opposition to equal access 
                                                                                                                           
derstood as a government endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint‖). 
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claims.  Thus, in this way, Summum crossed up both sides of the political 
spectrum. 
And indeed, Summum well illustrates the conceptual difficulties that 
equal access cases can pose for the Free Speech Clause.  For example, im-
agine Pleasant Grove were to set up and adhere to a written policy allowing 
all monuments that meet certain criteria to be permanently displayed in 
Pioneer Park.  Such a policy would create a public forum, and the criteria 
stated in the policy would define the forum‘s parameters.  Any group whose 
proposed monument fit the parameters—that is, any group whose monu-
ment fit the criteria stated in the policy—would have a constitutional right 
to put up its display in the park.  Yet that, of course, was not the case in 
Summum.  In Summum, there was no clear policy, and satisfying the poli-
cy‘s criteria did not guarantee anyone a spot in the park anyway.39  And this 
is what makes Summum‘s outcome somewhat unsettling—part of what 
saves Pleasant Grove here is its lack of transparency.  By keeping its criteria 
for monument selection vague, Pleasant Grove immunizes itself from liabil-
ity.  This hardly encourages responsible governmental action.40 
We see the corrupt incentives that this can create in equal access cases.  
Perhaps the most well known of these cases is Good News Club v. Milford 
Central School.41  In Good News, a school district excluded a Christian club 
from meeting on school grounds after school hours, while it continued al-
lowing other clubs to meet.  The Supreme Court held this to be viewpoint 
discrimination in a public forum and thus unconstitutional under the Free 
Speech Clause.  But perhaps, after Summum, a school district like Milford 
could be more strategic and discriminate more rather than less.  For, in 
theory, if Milford is selective enough, at some point its determination of 
which clubs can meet in its buildings after school looks like government 
speech, thereby making it constitutionally immune to any Free Speech chal-
lenge.42   
Consider, for example, a case from northern Virginia where a religious 





  There were serious factual disputes about whether Pleasant Grove consistently applied its policy, 
but a few things were clear.  First, Pleasant Grove did not develop any written policy until 2004, a year 
after Summum made the request to put up its monument.  The written policy was therefore not applied 
to Summum; it was written as a way of explaining why Summum‘s display had not been acceptable un-
der earlier uncodified standards.  Second, being deemed acceptable under the policy‘s criteria did not 
entitle anyone to erect their display.  As Pleasant Grove put it, ―[t]he city‘s internal policy sets criteria 
that are necessary, but not themselves sufficient, for acceptance and display of a proposed monument.‖  
Brief for Petitioners, supra note 35, at 46. 
40
  In other contexts, the Supreme Court has seen this sort of standardless discretion as incompatible 
with First Amendment values.  See, e.g., City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ‘g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 
758 (1988) (―[T]he absence of express standards makes it difficult to distinguish . . . between a licen-
sor‘s legitimate denial of a permit and its illegitimate abuse of censorial power.‖) (link). 
41
  533 U.S. 98 (2001) (link). 
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school system, claiming a right to send its flyers home with local school-
children.43  The school district generally allowed flyers of various types to 
be distributed in its classrooms and denied access to only a scarce few (in-
cluding Child Evangelism Fellowship).  To be precise, Montgomery County 
allowed 415 flyers—from over 225 different groups—and disallowed only 
32.44  The question then is whether the 32 denials are enough to convert the 
school district‘s decision into governmental speech.  One line in particular 
in Summum supports such a claim.  Late in the opinion, the Summum court 
said that ―where the application of forum analysis would lead almost in-
exorably to closing of the forum, it is obvious that forum analysis is out of 
place.‖45  The Montgomery County school district surely did not permit, and 
would not have permitted, certain types of flyers—like, say, partisan politi-
cal flyers, or flyers celebrating the use of illegal drugs, or flyers recruiting 
for the NRA, Planned Parenthood, or the Klan.46  Montgomery County 
would surely have closed the forum before tolerating such flyers.  But, if 
that is the case, then the above quotation from Summum suggests that no 
public forum ever really existed in the Montgomery County Schools and 
that Montgomery County‘s decisions to tolerate (or exclude) certain flyers 
are actually protected by the government speech doctrine.  Such an out-
come, of course, would doom many First Amendment claims of equal 
access. 
It is probably not fair to take Summum that far.  Certainly the bare 
holding in Summum does not require that.  And Summum‘s facts, again, are 
quite extreme; they are light years away from those of cases like Good 
News and Child Evangelism Fellowship, which involve public spaces being 
made simultaneously available to a wide variety of organizations.  Yet there 
is a deep tension between the equal access cases and the government speech 
doctrine—a tension that, at some point, the Supreme Court will have to 
consider and resolve.  Until then, everything is open to argument, and we 
can expect state and local governments to do their best to take advantage of 
Summum. 
C. Going Forward: Summum and Religious Endorsements 
 
Summum also has potential implications in cases where government 
endorses religion.  In those areas, Summum will mean that the government 
has unbridled discretion to shape the endorsement as it chooses.  Of course, 
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ing religious endorsements.  Summum will certainly not change that.  But 
there are domains where government can endorse religion, and as the 
Court‘s composition changes, those domains may grow or shrink.  So we 
can learn a bit about these possibilities by considering what Summum will 
mean in an area where the government does currently speak religiously—
namely, legislative prayer.   
Consider the facts of Turner v. City of Fredericksburg.47  There, the 
City Council of Fredericksburg adopted a policy requiring all prayers 
(which were traditionally given by city council members) to be nonsecta-
rian.  That is, prayers could not use language specific to particular denomi-
nations; they could not, for example, refer devotionally to Jesus Christ.  But 
one city council member, Hasmel Turner, insisted on addressing his prayers 
to Jesus Christ.  When he was excluded from giving prayers altogether, he 
sued, claiming a violation of the Free Speech Clause. 
Turner‘s claims were difficult before Summum, and Summum may well 
be the final nail in the coffin.  Applying the government speech doctrine to 
religious speech means that government simply has unqualified control over 
the religious message.  It could require all legislative prayers to be nonde-
nominational, or gender-neutral, or patriotic, or gay-friendly.  And those 
rules will hold even when government delegates the right to pray to outside 
individuals.  Private citizens tapped to lead legislative prayers are still pray-
ing on behalf of the government; they therefore still must obey the govern-
ment‘s restrictions.  This conclusion follows from Summum itself, but even 
more apposite is the most notorious case in the government speech canon, 
Rust v. Sullivan.48  Rust involved a challenge to a government act that pro-
vided doctors with family-planning funds but conditioned the money on the 
doctors not discussing abortion with patients.  The Supreme Court in Rust 
upheld this gag rule on the theory that the government was trying to send an 
anti-abortion message and thus had the power to regulate even ostensibly 
private speakers (the doctors) in order to ensure the anti-abortion message 
was properly conveyed.49   
Thus, if the government can put a gag rule on the doctors in Rust, it 
seems it can put a gag rule on legislative prayer givers as well, constraining 
their religious vocabulary however the government sees fit.  Indeed, a com-
plete adoption of the government speech doctrine in legislative prayer cases 
would even allow government to pick and choose prayergivers based on 
their religious affiliations—it would mean, for example, that the City of 
Fredericksburg could choose to allow only Christians to pray, or Protes-
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selves forbid discriminating against speakers in this way.51  Still, Justice 
Souter‘s concurrence in Summum rightly recognizes the tension between the 
two lines of cases.52  And the only way to reconcile the two is by limiting 
the government‘s ability to speak religiously—by keeping cases like Van 
Orden and Marsh narrow exceptions or by overruling them altogether. 
CONCLUSION 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum is not a groundbreaking case.  But it 
does offer the opportunity for some reflection on the intricate intersection 
between the Free Speech, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses.  This 
Essay has aspired to cover the decision, its assumptions, and its implica-
tions.  And it will not be long until the next page is written.  Only a month 
ago, the Supreme Court agreed to consider another case with both Free 
Speech and Establishment Clause aspects, Salazar v. Buono.53  Buono is a 
far harder case than Summum, and the Court will have a tougher time with 
the issues of governmental and private speech it raises. But that is another 
article for another day.54 
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